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REEDER.JOHN P.,JR. Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger, and War. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 237 pp. $35.00 (cloth); $16.95 
(paper). 
John Reeder stands in that admirable line of moral philosophers who, even in 
these postmodern times, are not ready to throw in the towel. Conceding the in­
commensurability of various conflicting foundational premises, both secular and 
theological, Reeder nonetheless argues that the current moral landscape yields a 
coherent "consensus" on such divisive issues as abortion, physician-assisted sui­
cide, warfare, and obligation to the starving-those wrenching questions of life 
and death which Reeder appropriately takes to be interrelated. 
Reeder's consensus, put briefly, presupposes a conception of"rights" (whether 
rooted in Kantianism or Aristotelianism or theology), including not only a (waiva­
ble) right not to be killed, but also a right to receive aid. Reeder's rights premise 
serves as an initial check to a utilitarian calculus that is otherwise legitimate. 
Thus, except in some specified override situations, one may not kill an individual 
person to save many others, but one may redistribute preexisting threats so as to 
destroy the fewest number. Therefore, in discussing two oft-juxtaposed hypothet­
icals, Reeder insists that a surgeon may not slay one patient to harvest vital organs 
for five, but a passenger on a runaway trolley headed toward five people may 
redirect the trolley onto a spur where it will kill one. Similarly, Reeder retains the 
double-effect test. Except in the "Nazi override" case (where the future of any 
rights-based civilization is on the line), one may not deliberately kill noncomba­
tants to demoralize the enemy, but one may do obliteration bombing of a legiti­
mate military target in the sure knowledge that noncombatants will be killed, so 
long as, under a proportionality test, lives thereby saved are not outweighed by 
lives taken. (Similarly, in traditional Catholic thought, one may remove a cancer­
ous uterus knowing the fetus will die, although one may not directly kill a fetus. ) 
Is consensus achieved? Reeder's approach is that of the analytic philosopher, 
proceeding by way of comparative hypothetical example. At that analytic level, I 
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have some quibbles. The elusive relation between causation and ethical responsi­
bility appears unresolved, and the vocabulary of double effect analysis remains 
inherently manipulable,as does the language of implicit proleptic "consent" in 
situations of"shared risk" (one basis for an override to the right not to be killed). 
Moreover,precisely at the most potentially divisive points of his analysis,Reeder 
is still forced to concede the problem of incommensurable premises. For example, 
a pure negative rights libertarian (and most of American law) would deny the 
positive right to receive aid,from which Reeder derives the duty to feed the starv­
ing and,potentially,the duty to continue most pregnancies. The latter duty would
depend on the moral status of the fetus,which,after an analytic appendi,:,Re­
eder does not resolve. Reeder treats the right not to be killed as no less waivable 
than the right to receive aid,thereby justifying physician-assisted suicide, even 
while noting that such "waivability" runs counter to the widely shared conviction 
that the ending of life is a matter of divine, not human,dominion. Physician­
assisted suicide is sufficiently contentious to be the subject of current Supreme 
Court litigation. Where,then,is the supposed "consensus"? 
Perhaps,however, the moral challenges we face in relation to killing and saving 
are not ultimately reducible to a series of analytic problems yielding single "solu­
tions" acceptable to the conventions of academic philosophr. Notably Jeffrey 
Stout,a pragmatist who,like Reeder,refuses either to surrender in the free of 
incommensurability or to retreat into traditional Aristotelianism,emphasizes in­
stead the protection of the internal goods of a variety of social institutions from 
whose traditions we might continually fashion (and refashion) a shared morality. 
Stout advocates,not logical consensus,but a process of bricolage-a weaving to­
gether of a"coat of many colors" from our various rich moral traditions a5 they 
are embedded in the internal goods of disparate social practice. 
At its best, analytic moral philosophy forces serious reflection and achieve:; new 
clarity. Reeder works seriously toward those goals. No analysis, however, should 
obscure the heavy weight of human responsibility we bear in life-and-death deci­
sion making. At one point Reeder discusses Michael Walzer's description of the 
burden of guilt assumed by political leaders during war, as they give orders that 
will lead to the killing even of noncombatants. Reeder seems puzzled. If the kill­
ings are logically justified, why guilt (p. 163)? This, I fear,is the danger of arro­
gance that lurks, as Karl Barth once warned, in morality conceived as rational 
exercise. However maddening the paradoxes of ethics done in the Barthian 
mode, there is some wisdom in his insistence that we live in a world of inevitable 
moral ambiguity, with the freedom we must exercise (even in taking animal life) 
always darkly shadowed by the "prior command to desist." 
ELIZABETH MENSCH. Stale University of New fork at Buffalo. 
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